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Perhaps the only accurate statement that can be made, after
examination of the decisions, is that, once a photograph has been
admitted, it is extremely unlikely that the Supreme Court will
declare its admission to be error. It would probably be difficult
to phrase a precise rule which is fair to the accused and which
does not, at the same time, unnecessarily hamper the prosecution.
Nevertheless, by indicating that only in cases of most unusual
circumstances should photographs of a corpse be rejected in a
trial involving homicide, the latest decisions of the Louisiana
Supreme Court have undoubtedly encouraged the admission in
evidence of gruesome photographs which have no real probative
value.
Sidney B. Galloway

EVIDENCE--THE HUSBAND-WIFE TESTIMONY PRIVILEGE
On the day before the trial began, defense counsel informed
both the district attorney and the judge that the defendant's wife,
who had been summoned as a witness by the state, wished to
exercise her privilege of refusing to testify against her husband.
In spite of this, the judge required that she appear in open court
and assert the privilege in the presence of the jury. On appeal
this procedure was sustained by the Supreme Court. State v.
McMullan, 223 La. 629, 66 So.2d 574 (1953).1
Recognition of the husband-wife privilege came about comparatively recently in the law of Louisiana,2 and the jurisprudence of this state has not clearly settled all-the aspects in connection with the exercise of the privilege. Before discussing the
effect of the principal case, it will be helpful to review briefly
the policy and historical background of the law on the general
subject of husband-wife testimony.
In its early stages, the common law recognized numerous
1. In the instant case the defendant was convicted of manslaughter. On
the night of the crime, his wife returned home and found him lying across
the bed, apparently intoxicated and asleep. When she woke him up, he
became enraged, got his shotgun and drove her from the house. A police
offcer, who happened to be in the vicinity, answered her cries for help and
returned with her to the house to quiet the defendant. As they entered the
house, the defendant, pointing the shotgun directly at the officer, told him
not to come any closer. After repeating this command several times, defen"dant shot and killed the officer.

2. La. Act 157 of 1916, now La. R.S. 1950, 15:461.
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grounds 3 for declaring a witness incompetent. One of these was
interest. A party to litigation could not testify because it was
feared that his self-interest would prevent truthful testimony.
Husband and wife were considered, in the eyes of the law, as
being one and the same person. For this reason, the spouse of
an interested party was also declared incompetent. 4 In recent
years, incompetency has to a great extent been abolished and, in
some instances, replaced by a privilege." Most jurisdictions today
recognize spouses as competent witnesses for or against each
other. 6 In connection with their testimony, two separate and
distinct privileges have evolved: (1) that preventing the disclosure 7 of confidential communications made during marriage
by one spouse to the other, 8 and (2) that preventing one spouse
from being required to testify against the other during the
marriage.9
Although the confidential communications privilege is not
within the scope of this note, it may be pointed out that the policy
behind it is entirely separate from that of the general spousal
testimony privilege. Its purpose is to foster and preserve the
trust and intimacy which should be inherent in the matrimonial
relation. 10 Numerous reasons have been advanced for the general
spousal testimony privilege." Perhaps the most frequently stated
is society's desire to preserve the harmony of the existing mar-,
3. In 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2227 (3d ed. 1940), a quotation from Sir
Edward Coke, Commentary on Littleton 6b, lists the five most important
grounds for incompetency: infamy, infidelity, insanity, infancy, and interest.
4. See Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 384 (1842).

5. Thayer, Cases on Evidence 1066 (2d ed. 1900), quoted in Morgan and
Maguire, Cases and Materials on Evidence 322 (3d ed. 1951): "At last in the
fourth and fifth decades of the [nineteenth] century, in England, nearly all
objections to competency were abolished, or turned into matters of privilege.
Similar changes, a little later, were widely made in this country."
6. Ibid.: "This last incompetency is largely abolished in this country;
the accused and the husband or wife have merely a privilege of silence."
7. This privilege applies, In nearly all jurisdictions, to both civil and
criminal cases. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 488 (3d ed. 1940) lists for each state
all statutes affecting organic and emotional capacity of witnesses, i.e.,
insanity, infancy, infamy, Interest and marital relationship. For Louisiana
law, see note 22 infra.
8. In 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2332 (3d ed. 1940), the author states that this
privilege is ordinarily that of the spouse who has made the communication,
and his or her consent is required before the other spouse is allowed to
reveal such communication.
9. In most jurisdictions this privilege is applicable in criminal cases only.
It is normally conferred on the accused, who must consent before the spouse
may testify against him. A few states, among them, Louisiana, Massachusetts and Connecticut, confer the privilege solely on the witness spouse.
2 Wigmore, Evidence § 488 (3d ed. 1940).
10. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2332 (3d ed. 1940).
11. Id. at § 2228.
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riage by preventing the permanent ill feeling between the spouses
that might result if one were required to give unfavorable testi12
mony against the other.
It can readily be seen that both these privileges, by permitting a party to withhold evidence, can be an obstruction to truth
and justice. The policies underlying these privileges are, therefore, in conflict with the public desire to see crime punished and
to have a just decision rendered in each litigation.. Since the
inception of the general husband-wife privilege, many legal
scholars and jurists 3 have argued that the purpose served by
this privilege is of little value and does not justify the withholding of competent, material evidence. 1 4 Nevertheless, the privilege
is widely recognized today.' 5
The development of the law on husband-wife testimony in
Louisiana, particularly in criminal cases, has been closely aligned
with that in the common law. In 1805, by the so-called "Crimes
Act,"'16 the common law principles in the field of criminal law
were formally accepted by the Territorial Legislature. Thereafter, in 1821, Edward Livingston was commissioned by the Legislature "to draw and prepare a criminal code.' 7 Among the four
codes that Livingston prepared was a Code of Evidence, which
proposed that husband and wife be competent witnesses and
made no provision for privileges of any kind in regard to their
testimony for or against one another.'8 The Legislature never
adopted the proposed code and retained instead those common
law principles which had been adopted in 1805. Louisiana cases
in the period following held the husband and wife to be incompe12. Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 384 (1842); Brosman,
Edward Livingston and Spousal Testimony in Louisiana, 11 Tulane L. Rev.
243 (1937).
13. Appleton, Bentham, Livingston, Wigmore, Brosman. The American
Law Institute Model Code of Evidence does not contain a provision for, the
general testimony privilege.
14. Apparently the general feeling is that the confidential communications
privilege is justifiable and necessary. No strong criticisms of this privilege
were found by the writer, and such a privilege Is provided for in A.L.I.,
Model Code of Evidence c. III, § 215 et seq. (1942).
15. See note 7 supra.
16. La. Acts of 1805, c. 50, § 33, p. 440, provided that the rules of evidence
in criminal cases "shall be except as is by this act provided for, according to
the said common law." For a discussion of the Civil Code articles which
before Act 157 of 1916 provided for the incompetency of husband and wife in
civil cases, see Brosman, Edward Livingston and Spousal Testimony in Louisiana, 11 Tulane L. Rev. 243 (1937).
17. 1 Complete Works of Edward Livingston on Criminal Jurisprudence
4 (1873).
18. Id. at 452 et seq., discussed In Brosman, supra note 16, at 251.
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tent to testify either for or against one another. 19 Act 29 of 1886,20
applying to criminal cases, incorporated this principle into statute.
By Act 157 of 1916,21 Louisiana abandoned this early common
law concept. Spouses were made competent witnesses in all cases,
and the two privileges mentioned above were set forth as follows:
"Section 1 .... the competent witness in any proceeding,
civil or criminal,... shall be a person of proper understanding, but: First. Private conversations between husband and
wife shall be privileged. Second. Neither husband nor wife
shall be compelled to be a witness on any trial upon an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, against the
22
other."
The application of the general testimony privilege is limited to
criminal cases in which one spouse is the accused, and the privilege is made solely that of the witness spouse. There were several cases,23 decided shortly after the enactment of this statute,
which contained dicta to the effect that the witness spouse could
refuse to testify either for or against the accused. In State v.
Todd, 24 however, the statute was interpreted to limit the privilege
to a refusal to take the stand at the instance of the state. 25 The
court stated that the witness spouse had no right to refuse to
testify if called by the accused.
Thus, the extent of the privilege under Louisiana law may be
summed up briefly as follows:
(1) It is applicable only in criminal cases.
19. Several cases typical of this period are State v. Brown, 28 La. Ann. 279
(1876); Cull v. Herwig, 18 La. Ann. 315 (1866); Tulley v. Alexander, 11 La.
Ann. 421 (1856); State v. Johnson, 9 La. Ann. 308 (1854).
20. ". . . the competent witness in all criminal matters, shall be a person
of proper understanding; provided, that the husband cannot be a witness for
or against his wife, nor the wife for or against her husband .. "
21. The pertinent part of this statute was incorporated into the Code of
Criminal Procedure as Article 461 by La. Act 2 of 1928, § 1, now La. R.S. 1950,
15:461.
22. When the Revised Statutes of 1950 were enacted, the part on confidential communications was left out of 13:3665, which applies to civil cases.
Whether or not this privilege now applies in civil cases or was omitted
merely through oversight is an open question.
23. State v. Guillory, 163 La. 98, 111 So. 612 (1927); State v. Dejean, 159
La. 900, 106 So. 374 (1925); State v. Webb, 156 La. 952, 101 So. 338 (1924);
Tortorich v. Maestri, 146 La. 124, 83 So. 431 (1919).
24. 173 La. 23, 136 So. 76 (1931).
25. For a discussion of the interpretation of this statute, see Comment,
6 Tulane L. Rev. 489 (1937).
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(2)

The witness spouse may testify for the prosecution
26
regardless of the wishes of the accused.

(3)

The witness spouse may refuse to testify for the prose27
cution.
The accused may require the testimony of the spouse
28
whether or not the spouse wishes to testify.

(4)

The uncertain aspects of the privilege in Louisiana involve
the inference which is drawn both when the witness spouse
asserts the privilege and will not testify for the state, and when
the accused fails to have the spouse testify in his or her behalf.
The most natural inference in these situations is that the testimony would be unfavorable to the accused.2 9 There are several
means by which a district attorney might impress this inference
on the minds of the jury. He might require the witness to assert
the privilege in the presence of the jury, comment on the assertion of the privilege, or comment on the failure of the accused
to have the spouse testify. Quaere: Is it necessary, in order to
carry out the policy behind the privilege, that the accused be
protected from any unfavorable inference that might arise from
the exercise of the privilege?
In the case of State v. Morgan, 0 the district attorney began
to comment on the failure of the accused's wife to testify, but,
on objection by defense counsel, the trial judge prevented any
further comment along these lines. The Supreme Court held that,
in view of the judge's intervention, there was no reversible error,
but the court expressly refused to rule on whether or not comment should have been allowed.
The question thus left unanswered by the Morgan case was
81
placed squarely before the court in the case of State v. Todd.
26. State v. Dejean, 159 La. 900, 106 So. 374 (1925); State v. Webb, 156 La.
952, 101 So. 338 (1924).
27. State v. Warlick, 179 La. 997, 155 So. 460 (1934); State v. Todd, 173 La.
23, 136 So. 76 (1931).
28. State v. Todd, 173 La. 23, 136 So. 76 (1931).
29. It is possible that a spouse, who knows facts which would be favorable to the defendant, might wish to see the defendant convicted. Therefore,
the inference that his or her testimony would be damaging to the accused
might lead to a false conclusion in some cases. Also, the failure of the
accused to call the spouse to the stand might be due to fear that the testimony given would be untruthful or deliberately colored so as to be unfavorable. These situations are probably encountered very rarely, if at all, and
there is hence justification for the natural inference that, in the absence of
a showing of animosity between the spouses, the testimony is withheld to
protect the accused.
30. 142 La. 755, 77 So. 588 (1918).
31. 173 La. 23, 136 So. 76 (1931).
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In the trial the district attorney had been permitted, over the
objection of defense counsel, to comment on the failure of the
accused to call his wife to the stand. On appeal, the Supreme
Court stated: "The wife, in this case, witnessed the homicide.
Defendant had the right to place her on the stand, whether she
was willing to take the stand or not. The state did not have that*
right. Therefore the district attorney had the right to comment
"....
32 It
upon defendant's failure to put his wife on the stand .
can be seen that the court's main concern with the privilege was
in its consideration of whether or not the statute allows the
accused to call his wife as a witness. After holding that it does,
the court found no difficulty in allowing comment upon the failure of defendant to call his wife to the stand.3 3 No mention was
made of the policy and purpose which the privilege was meant to
serve, but the court undoubtedly considered them, or was at least
influenced by their attitude towards the policy.
The procedure upheld by the Todd decision, while not
directly affecting the privilege or its exercise, nevertheless has
the tendency to coerce an accused into placing his or her spouse
on the stand in order to avoid harmful comments that might
otherwise be made. No cases could be found involving comment
by the district attorney on the actual assertion of the privilege
by the witness spouse. Whether or not such comment would be
permitted is an open question, but in view of the present tendency of the court, as shown in the principal case, it would, in all
probability, be permitted.
In the instant case the court carried the process of reducing
the application of the husband-wife privilege even further. Relying somewhat on the Todd case,8 4 but principally on the case of
State v. Warlick,3 5 the court held that the wife of the accused
could be required to assert her privilege in the presence of the
jury. It was argued with considerable logic by the defense counsel that the Warlick case could be distinguished on its facts, 3 6
32. 173 La. 23, 29, 136 So. 76, 78.
33. La. R.S. 1950, 15:382, provides that "counsel have the right to draw
from evidence received, or from the failure to produce evidence shown to
be in the possession of the opposite party, any conclusion which to them may

seem fit."
34. The court cited State v. Todd and stated that: "Under the jurisprudence, the district attorney has the right to comment on the failure of he
accused to have his witness spouse testify in his behalf. Surely, this practice
causes greater harm to the party on trial than that complained of in the

instant case." 66 So.2d 574, 576 (La. 1953).
35. 179 La. 997, 155 So. 460 (1934).
36. The Warlick opinion states the facts in that case to be as follows:
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inasmuch as the defense counsel in that case voluntarily informed
the court in the presence of the jury that the wife wished to
assert her privilege. In the principal case the court rejected this
as a basis for distinguishing the Warlick case and stated that the
rationale of the decision was that the accused "was not prejudiced" by the procedure. It refused to limit the rule of the
Warlick case to the particular facts involved. On the basis of
the facts and holding of the principal case, there seems to be no
means by which the defense counsel roay prevent the witness
spouse from being called and required to assert her privilege in
the presence of the jury.3 7 This procedure very forcibly calls
the attention of the jury to the logical implication that the witness
spouse is withholding his or her testimony because of a desire not
to harm the accused. The effect is to place the spouse in somewhat of a dilemma. Assume that the testimony of a wife, for
instance, would be of some, but only slight, value to the prosecution in convicting her husband. She might therefore wish not to
testify; yet the assertion of the privilege in the presence of the
jury might create in the jury's minds an exaggerated idea as to
the nature and importance of her testimony. As in the Todd case,
the result of the McMullan decision is to reduce the freedom of
choice as to whether or not the privilege will be exercised.
True, the procedures sanctioned by the Todd and McMullan
cases could hardly have created ill feeling between the particular
spouses involved. Nevertheless, the decisions, by limiting the
protection afforded the marriage relation by the privilege, have
limited the extent to which the policy underlying it may be
carried out. As mentioned previously, legal scholars have long
been opposed to the general husband-wife privilege.38 In recent
"The wife of the accused was summoned as a witness by the state. After a
jury was impaneled, counsel for defendant requested the court to sequester
all witnesses, both for the state and for the defense. The wife of the
accused, being one of the witnesses, was called to the bar along with the
others. Counsel for defendant informed the court that Mrs. Warlick was
not willing to testify in the case. Whereupon the court, in the presence of
the jury, asked her if she would refuse to testify and she stated that she
would. On being asked why, she stated that her refusal was based upon the
ground that she was the wife of the accused. Whereupon the court excused

her." 179 La. 997, 999, 155 So. 460, 461.
37. There

is

possibility

for argument

that

the

holding

of

State

v.

McMullan overruled to some extent the decision in State v. Todd. The earlier
decision was apparently based in part on the theory that the district attorney
could not call the witness spouse. As he now unquestionably has this right,

although he cannot require testimony, does this affect the right of comment? Should the district attorney be allowed to comment on the failure of
the accused to have his spouse testify if he (the district attorney) makes no

effort himself to call the spouse?
38. See note 13 supra.
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years the force and logic of their arguments have received
increasing recognition, possibly because of the change in presentday attitude towards the matrimonial relation. 39 There has been
a slow but definite trend throughout the common law jurisdictions towards the abolition of the privilege altogether.4° The
Legislature, in drafting Act 157 of 1916, did not clearly indicate
the extent to which it intended the policy behind the privilege
to be carried out.41 Therefore, in cases presenting aspects of the

privilege not covered specifically by the statute, the court has
been obliged to rely largely on its own discretion as to whether
the protection afforded by the privilege should be limited or
extended. It is submitted that the position taken by the court
is completely justified.
Sidney B. Galloway

MINERAL RIGHTS-DAMAGES FOR FAILURE TO DiuL-LEASE INTERPRETATION

Plaintiff, lessor, sought damages from defendant, lessee, for
alleged breach of contract to drill on her land. A rider attached
to a form lease provided:
"Notwithstanding any other provisions contained herein it is
understood and agreed that this lease shall be forfeited and
rendered null and void unless on or before sixty days from
the date lessee commences the actual drilling of a well at
some point within one mile of the above described property
and prosecutes such drilling with due diligence to a depth
of 3,300 feet unless oil or gas is discovered in paying quantities at a lesser depth, and if said well is completed as well
capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities, then, in
the event, lessee shall commence the actual drilling of a
39. Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence:
Family Relations, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 675 (1929).
40. Report by the American Bar Association's Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence as quoted in 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (3d

ed. 1940):

"The privilege has been abolished in only a few States; but a

tendency to extend the abolition has recently been apparent, not only in civil
litigation but in criminal prosecutions. . . . It is recommended that the

privilege protecting from being called one against the other be abolished
(1) in civil cases, and (2) in criminal cases."
41. Statutes which include a specific provision protecting the accused
from adverse inference created by the exercise of the husband-wife privilege
are by no means rare. For a full list of such enactments, see 3 Wigmore,
Evidence § 2272 (3d ed. 1940).

